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Companion to Endgame at Stalingrad - Colonel David M. Glantz - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Military Service and American Democracy - William A. Taylor - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

A Yankee Ace in the RAF - - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Battalion Commanders at War - Steven Thomas Barry - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Battalion Commanders at War - Steven Thomas Barry - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Most histories of the U.S. Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialised without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops, ineffective leadership at higher levels, and deficiencies in equipment, organisation, and mobilisation. Barry portrays these officers as highly trained, adaptable, and courageous in their first combat experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Their leadership, he argues, brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality, and thus contributed significantly to battlefield success in North Africa and Sicily in 1942–1943. To explain how this happened, he examines their prewar experiences, including professional military education and unit training exercises; personal factors such as calmness and physical resilience under fire; and the ability to draw upon doctrine, creatively apply the resources at their disposal, and clearly define and communicate mission goals and means. He also reveals how battalion leaders incorporated technological innovations into combined arms manoeuvres by employing tank capabilities and close air support doctrine. As Barry’s assessment shows, these battalion commanders were not the sole reason for the Allied triumph in North Africa and Sicily, but victory would not have been possible without the special brand of military leadership they exhibited throughout those campaigns. Under their leadership, even inexperienced units were able to deliver credible combat performance, and without the regular army battalion leaders, U.S. units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. One of the few studies to focus on tactical adaptation at the battalion level in conventional warfare, Barry’s book attests to the pivotal value of professional military education—and makes an important contribution to today’s “organisational learning” debate—while providing an in-depth view of adaptation of U.S. infantry and armoured forces in 1942–1943.

DKK 584.00
1

Marshall and His Generals - Stephen R. Taaffe - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Marshall and His Generals - Stephen R. Taaffe - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theatres of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it. Stephen Taaffe chronicles and critiques the background, character, achievements, and failures of the more than three dozen general officers chosen for top combat group commands—from commanders like Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur to some nearly forgotten. Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army’s commanders. Among his chief criteria were character (including “unselfish and devoted purpose”), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theatre commanders. Taaffe brings into sharp focus the likes of Eisenhower, MacArthur, George Patton, Omar Bradley, Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, Lucian Truscott, J. Lawton Collins, Alexander “Sandy” Patch, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark Clark, and twenty-five other generals who served in the conflict. He describes their leadership and decision-making processes and provides miniature biographies and personality sketches of these men drawn from their personal papers, official records, and reflections of fellow officers. Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall’s selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement. Ambitious in scope and filled with sharp insights, Marshall and His Generals is essential reading for anyone interested in World War II and military leadership more generally.

DKK 347.00
1

Stumbling Colossus - David M. Glantz - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Stumbling Colossus - David M. Glantz - Bog - University Press of Kansas - Plusbog.dk

Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West-including combat records of early engagements-David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns—and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany. Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated. At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness-and willingness-to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.

DKK 475.00
1